Great moments of diplomacy: How Switzerland mediated between Eastern and Western powers

Sometimes the present seems like a mockery of history. In December 1994, 53 countries from East and West signed a declaration in Budapest entitled "The Road to Genuine Partnership in a New Era." In this document, the European states, Russia, the Central Asian republics, the United States, and Canada affirmed their shared values ​​and reaffirmed their commitment to tackling the challenges of the 21st century together.

In a further agreement, the "Budapest Memorandum," Ukraine pledged to sign the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to renounce all its Soviet-made nuclear weapons. In return, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom reaffirmed their security guarantees for Ukraine and pledged to respect its sovereignty and the inviolability of its borders.

These decisions seem cynical thirty years later. They were adopted at the Budapest Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The CSCE was founded during the Cold War with the aim of facilitating orderly coexistence between West and East in Europe. In 1973, 35 countries met for a conference in Helsinki, where a Final Act was adopted in 1975. In this conference, the participants agreed on a common code of conduct, compliance with which was reviewed at several subsequent conferences. After the end of the Cold War, the East-West dialogue continued under a new name: in 1994, also at the Budapest Summit, the CSCE was renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Switzerland, one of the CSCE founding states, was also represented in Budapest. Its diplomats noted that, despite the fine rhetoric of "genuine partnership," strong differences also emerged, particularly between the fallen hegemon Russia and the remaining superpower, the United States.

"Although Russia is on the verge of a political, economic, and social crisis," said the Swiss chief negotiator, Ambassador Benedikt von Tscharner, "Moscow signaled self-confidence and great power awareness in an almost traditional manner." President Boris Yeltsin sharply criticized the plans to expand NATO to include the states of Eastern Europe. And he made it clear "that European security policy cannot be developed without Russia's actual participation," the Swiss diplomat reported.

At the same time, the West is also "in a difficult search for a new meaning in the structures of integration and cooperation that have developed since the end of the Second World War," according to von Tscharner. The debates surrounding NATO and EU eastward expansion act "as a kind of foil, making this uncertainty even more apparent." Certain sentences from the report still resonate today: "The future of the American presence in Europe and the EU's progress toward genuine capacity for action are particularly difficult to predict."

Ambassador von Tscharner was a keen observer in Budapest, partly because he knew that his country would play a prominent role in fleshing out the vaunted security partnership. At the Budapest Summit, Switzerland's candidacy for the OSCE Chairmanship in 1996 was accepted. This marked a high point in Switzerland's commitment to one of the most outstanding achievements of European diplomacy during the Cold War.

The CSCE was a product of the so-called policy of détente: after a period of confrontation, a window of East-West dialogue opened in the late 1960s and 1970s. In 1969, the Warsaw Pact states proposed convening a pan-European security conference. The Soviet Union hoped this would safeguard the status quo in Europe and cement its dominance over the Eastern European vassal states. Western Europe agreed to this – with one reservation: the USA and Canada, whose military presence on the continent counterbalanced the USSR, would also be at the table. Furthermore, the West insisted on negotiating human rights issues alongside security and economic cooperation.

After several preparatory meetings, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe took place in Helsinki in July 1973. In addition to the Warsaw Pact and NATO states, various neutral countries also participated, including Switzerland. Two years later, on August 1, 1975, the CSCE Final Act was signed. It was not a conventional agreement, but rather an agreement between East and West on shared values, the "Helsinki Principles." The states committed themselves not only to the inviolability of borders and the peaceful settlement of disputes, but also to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to cooperation in economics, science, and the environment. The Helsinki Final Act remains the only truly pan-European political framework to this day – alongside the globally valid UN Charter.

The negotiations on the Final Act were conducted in Geneva from 1973 to 1975. Switzerland, a member of neither the UN nor the European Community, experienced some of its diplomatic glory here and, for the first time, not only defended its economic interests but also took a position on fundamental political issues such as the enforcement of human rights.

The small states benefited from the fact that any decision-making in the CSCE depended on the consent of all participants. In cooperation with the delegations of the neutral partners Austria, Sweden, and Finland, as well as with non-aligned Yugoslavia, Swiss diplomacy, with its pragmatism and mediation skills, succeeded in resolving deadlocks in the discussions between the blocs. However, the prerequisite for the success of the CSCE was always a shared interest in reaching an understanding between the superpowers, the USA and the USSR.

As early as the end of the 1970s, tensions between East and West began to resurface. Among other things, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the NATO Double-Track Decision hardened the fronts. In 1979, NATO announced, on the one hand, that it would station its own medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, while, on the other, calling for negotiations with the Soviet Union to prevent further rearmament. Nevertheless, the CSCE continued to exist as a pan-European forum. After Helsinki, the participating states maintained dialogue on security and military policy issues, economic exchange, and human rights issues at follow-up conferences in Belgrade, Madrid, and Vienna.

Switzerland provided mediation services together with the neutral and non-aligned states of Europe, but also contributed its own initiatives. For example, it organized several meetings on peaceful dispute settlement, which culminated in the establishment of a CSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in Geneva in 1992. In 1986, it held a seminar in Bern on facilitating family reunification and marriage across the Iron Curtain.

The CSCE enabled human rights to establish themselves as a topic of European diplomacy. The growing number of dissidents in the Eastern Bloc states could invoke the Helsinki Principles, to which their governments had committed themselves in 1975, in their protests. While not decisive, the CSCE process did contribute to the dismantling of the unjust regimes in Eastern Europe.

This happened very quickly. In 1989, free elections were held in Poland and Hungary, and the Berlin Wall between East and West Germany fell. In Czechoslovakia, the "Velvet Revolution" ousted the communists from power, and the dictatorships of Bulgaria and Romania were overthrown. The "results of the transition" were enshrined in the CSCE: In a series of conferences, the member states committed themselves to the principles of a market economy, defined extensive rules on pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, free elections, and respect for human rights. They also discussed the problems of national minorities.

At the CSCE Special Summit in Paris in November 1990, initiated by Soviet reformist President Mikhail Gorbachev with the support of the United States, the Cold War finally seemed to be over. The "Charter of Paris for a New Europe," signed by the heads of state and government, ushered in an "era of democracy, peace, and unity" after the end of the East-West conflict. "What the peoples have longed for for decades is beginning," said Swiss President Arnold Koller in his speech in Paris: "an era of cooperation between East and West, with the goal of building a new, united Europe . "

But disillusionment soon followed. The formerly socialist multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia, also undergoing radical change, began to disintegrate in a cascade of wars in 1991. The CSCE lacked any instruments to intervene. Even the initially peaceful dissolution of the USSR was by no means conflict-free. This was due to the difficult conditions in the Soviet successor states, which were unprepared for their independence. It was also due to the fact that Russia, from the outset, showed little interest in respecting the sovereignty of its new neighbors.

It quickly became clear that Moscow considered the "near abroad" to be part of its exclusive sphere of influence. Thus, the crumbling superpower kept troops stationed in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania until 1993 and 1994, respectively—partly to exert pressure on their policies toward the Russian minorities, some of which were very numerous in the Baltic states. Russian support for the separatist movements in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia prevented Azerbaijan and Georgia from gaining complete control of their territory from the outset.

As in the South Caucasus, Russia also stationed so-called peacekeeping troops in the Central Asian country of Tajikistan, with which it not only ensured stability in the conflict zone but also secured extensive influence over local politics. Moscow also exerted economic pressure on its neighboring states to achieve political goals – for example, Ukraine was offered cheap energy, which was made contingent on concessions regarding the status of Crimea and the division of the Black Sea Fleet.

Russia's claim to act as a force for order in its former sphere of influence was already being extensively questioned at the time, including in Switzerland. For example, during a visit by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to the head of the Federal Department of Defense, Federal Councilor Kaspar Villiger, in November 1993.

Both statesmen emphasized that the CSCE must be strengthened so that it can prevent impending conflicts in a timely manner using political means – beyond this conviction, however, their views diverged considerably. The Russian Defense Minister – "convinced of Russia's role as a global power" – openly admitted "that he could certainly imagine the use of military force in 'nearby foreign countries' to 'prevent' conflicts," even without a mandate from the UN or the CSCE. "In my opinion, Grachev's statements on this topic leave little doubt that Russia continues to adhere to a stabilization policy with a hegemonic background and, if possible, would like to present this as a means of securing peace," noted Federal Councilor Villiger .

"Russia has legitimate security interests in its neighboring countries," the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) stated in a position paper at the time. "However, this statement applies even more strongly in the opposite direction: For obvious reasons, the security policy interest of a state such as Estonia or Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia is far greater than the opposite" – especially since democracy in Russia is by no means firmly established.

As a small, neutral state, according to the FDFA, Switzerland has a "special responsibility to consider the concerns of those states that could be abused as pawns of the major powers." Bern therefore expressed great understanding for the fears harbored by Russia's neighbors: In order to avoid becoming involved in post-Soviet conflicts, the West could not only tolerate Moscow's position as a hegemonic power, but even co-finance a Russian military presence under the label of CSCE peacekeeping.

During this period of upheaval, Switzerland therefore made a sincere effort, using the limited resources of multilateral diplomacy, to help resolve or prevent conflicts in Eastern Europe. It participated in diplomatic reconnaissance missions in the former Yugoslavia as early as 1991 and sent military observers to the conflict zone starting in 1992. In 1993, the Federal Council approved Swiss participation in a peacekeeping operation in Nagorno-Karabakh , and it appointed top diplomat Edouard Brunner to the UN Secretary-General as Special Representative for Georgia.

Consequently, Switzerland also offered to assume the OSCE chairmanship in 1996. It did so, however, in the knowledge that the Swiss presidency's "opportunities for shaping the future and chances of success" would remain limited and that its ability to act would depend on the interests of the main actors, namely Russia and the NATO states.

Ultimately, it was primarily the post-war order and reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina that occupied Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti as Chairman of the OSCE in 1996. But developments in Russia, and especially the war in the Caucasus republic of Chechnya, also kept the OSCE on its toes at the time.

Switzerland assumed the chairmanship for a second time after 1996 in 2014, a pivotal year for East-West relations, when Russian forces annexed the Crimean peninsula and Moscow instigated a secessionist war in eastern Ukraine by infiltrating troops. At that time, the OSCE brokered a fragile ceasefire in Minsk under the leadership of Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. With the Russian invasion of February 24, 2022, it became completely worthless.

Let's return to the Budapest Summit of 1994, when Ambassador Benedikt von Tscharner, in light of the renewed diverging interests in East and West, pondered the CSCE's most important task for the future. Pan-European security cooperation must primarily allay Russia's "fear of isolation." "It will only succeed in this," von Tscharner continued, "if it manages to grant Moscow a European homeland, but not a legally binding special role." Even this quote seems almost spiteful today, given that that well-tempered strategy has clearly failed.

Since last December, it has been clear that Switzerland will preside over the OSCE for the third time in 2026. Compared to the 1996 presidency, the challenges appear immeasurably greater.

An article from the « NZZ am Sonntag »