Bolivia: Violence, Crisis, and a Disputed Electoral Scenario

Less than two months before the presidential elections of August 17, 2025, Bolivia is experiencing one of the most complex political situations since the restoration of democracy. The combination of a deep fracture within the ruling party, a dispersed opposition, weakened institutions, and a structural economic crisis have led to an escalation of violence and growing doubts about the legitimacy and viability of the electoral process. Far from being just another election, these elections could become a new turning point for Bolivian democracy.

The country's recent history helps us understand the current situation. In recent decades, Bolivia has alternated periods of stability with institutional upheavals, such as those experienced in 2008, 2019, and even during the coup attempt denounced by President Luis Arce last year. But what distinguishes the present is that polarization no longer exists between the ruling party and the opposition, but within the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), the hegemonic party since 2006. The dispute between Evo Morales and Luis Arce not only strains the party structure but also disrupts the political landscape, impedes the consolidation of alternatives, and puts the entire system in jeopardy.

Neither Morales nor Arce. But how can we understand the conflicts of recent weeks? Two months ago, the Plurinational Constitutional Court upheld Evo Morales's disqualification as a presidential candidate, based on the constitutional limit of two consecutive terms. Morales, who governed from 2006 to 2019, denounced the decision as a betrayal by Arce himself, whom he himself anointed as his successor in 2020, and called on his social base to resist. The response was immediate: blockades at strategic points in the country such as the Tropic of Cochabamba and Potosí, marches toward the capital, threats of electoral boycotts, and rising levels of violence. But while all this is happening, the former president also has an arrest warrant forcing him to remain imprisoned under several security rings and under the protection of his followers in Lauca Ñ, his main political stronghold.

For his part, the current president, Luis Arce, also withdrew from the race. He did so, citing the need to avoid the fragmentation of the leftist vote, although his resignation also reflected an inescapable reality: his limited electoral support (5% of voting intention, according to the pollster CiesMori, in May 2025) and his lack of control over the party apparatus. Arce never managed to consolidate his own structure within the MAS or an autonomous power bloc. Throughout these years, the party remained in Evo's hands through parent organizations such as the Bolivian Workers' Central (COB) and the Chapare coca growers' federations.

In this context, a new name emerged: Andrónico Rodríguez, president of the Senate and a lower-profile coca grower leader with connections to both sectors. Supported by Arce and linked to Evo's entourage, Andrónico appears as a transitional figure or "bridge candidate," channeling the hardline MAS vote, but without the costs of Morales or the confrontations of Arce. His candidacy seeks to preserve the unity of the ruling party, although Evo insists that he alone should be the candidate.

Crisis context. All of this is occurring in a context of growing institutional and social deterioration. Between June 7 and 11, Bolivia experienced one of its most violent weeks in years: five people died (three police officers, a firefighter, and a protester), at least 17 were injured, and more than 40 were arrested. Dynamite attacks, ambushes, and the use of firearms by protesters were reported in several regions. The government blamed the infiltration of armed groups linked to drug trafficking, while the opposition denounced a militarization of the country with more than 5,000 troops deployed. The lines between social protest, organized crime, and state repression are becoming increasingly blurred.

At the same time, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is also facing criticism. Both supporters of the "Evo" movement and the opposition have denounced bias and a lack of transparency. The body disqualified Morales, but has yet to generate consensus on the electoral roll, which in 2023 was questioned for presenting more than 800,000 entries with irregularities. The OAS and the UN, for their part, have not yet confirmed their participation as international observers. And without observers, without political agreement, and with a military presence in key areas, the electoral process runs the risk of being strongly contested.

And as if all this weren't enough, the current state of the economy further exacerbates the problem. Bolivia is experiencing one of its worst macroeconomic periods since the beginning of the century. In 2024, growth was barely 1.3%, and for this year, it is projected to reach 1.5%. The fiscal deficit is around 8% of GDP, international reserves have been reduced to half of what they were in 2014, and the parallel dollar is trading up to 30% above the official rate. Added to this is the collapse in gas exports, which fell from $6 billion to less than $1.5 billion annually, and informal employment, which exceeds 70%.

Although inflation remains relatively contained, wages are stagnant and social unrest is growing. Protests over fuel, medicine, and food shortages aren't just a response to partisan divides: they also express discontent with a model that, for many, no longer provides solutions.

The opposition is also unconvincing. But while the ruling party is fracturing and witnessing one of the worst sociopolitical and economic crises in decades, the opposition also seems unable to reassemble and remains unable to find an effective strategy. Carlos Mesa, who came in second in the 2020 elections, has lost prominence. Luis Fernando Camacho has remained in prison since 2022, and other leaders, such as Manfred Reyes Villa and Samuel Doria Medina, are failing to connect with the electorate. Polls reflect this paralysis: no opposition candidate surpasses 15% of the vote, and in key regions, such as El Alto and rural areas, the MAS still retains a significant social base. But, faced with such a setback, why can't the opposition consolidate itself? Because the anti-MAS rhetoric is no longer enough. The electorate is seeking concrete responses to the crisis, and the fragmented opposition prevents the construction of a solid alternative. Without a broad coalition, clear leadership, and a territorial presence, the opposition blocs risk becoming irrelevant again.

Scenarios: order, violence, or electoral suspension. What could happen after August 17? Given this, there are three scenarios: first, a relatively orderly election, with international participation, a victory for the MAS (with Andrónico or another candidate), and acceptance of the results. This is the least likely alternative, but still possible if minimal agreements are reached.

The second, an election lacking legitimacy, with cross-accusations, violence, possible abstention in key regions, and a contested result that would worsen the crisis.

And the third, the postponement or suspension of the electoral process, if violence escalates or if one of the most powerful actors (Evo, the government, or the military) decides to break the institutional framework.

In any case, Bolivia is at a crossroads. Recent history shows that underestimating the mobilization capacity of social actors, the volatility of institutions, and the tension between legality and legitimacy can have extremely high costs. There is still time for a national dialogue to avoid collapse. But every week that passes without an agreement is one step closer to the abyss.

*Bachelor's degree in Political Science (UCA). Researcher at the Center for International Studies (CEI-UCA). Co-host of the podcast El Cafecito Latinoamericano on YouTube.