The problem with European defense is that it has so many millions... in its holster.

NATO's 32 members will congratulate themselves this week for having agreed to increase their defense budgets from 2% of GDP today to 3.5% by 2032. They will add around 1.5% of related spending—such as infrastructure, civil defense, or cybersecurity—to reach the 5% demanded by Donald Trump as a condition for keeping the United States engaged in Europe. They might even find a solution to accommodate Spain's reluctance to spend so much on defense. However, the real problem is the wait-and-see attitude European governments have adopted regarding actual military spending .

Not even a solemn, joint commitment at the NATO meeting in Brussels will change the reality of the situation over the past two years, in which executives have promised money they either don't have or are reluctant to spend. Furthermore, as noted in a report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy published last week, the abstract debate over spending figures has obscured the lack of real procurement and large equipment orders. At the current pace, it would take several decades for Europe to be ready for war, the authors note.

The organization's defense ministers agreed in 2006 to increase their national defense budgets to 2% of GDP, and it took them 19 years to achieve this. It may not take that long to reach the new target: Europeans now face a serious Russian threat on their eastern flank and must prepare for the credible scenario of a US withdrawal from their continent. But for now, budgets have only increased incrementally, and major defense contractors are still waiting for orders before committing to long-term investments, while Europe appears impervious to the emergency created by a new Russian offensive in Ukraine.

European NATO members (excluding Turkey) spent more than €450 billion on defense in 2024. This was a significant increase, 21%, compared to what they allocated in 2023, when their military spending had already increased by 18% compared to 2022, the year Russia invaded Ukraine. However, while everyone seems to agree that the 3.5% target is appropriate, given the new geopolitical context, governments across the region appear to be mired in widespread fatigue. In the United Kingdom and France, the two largest military powers in the region, public debt, exceeding 100% of GDP, forces us to face reality: if defense is a priority, taxes will have to be raised or other public spending cuts will have to be cut.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has so far refused to commit to the 3.5% target, and his chancellor, Rachel Reeves, has warned that military spending will be limited to 2.6% of GDP until the end of the current parliament in 2029. French President Emmanuel Macron has accepted the target, but without setting a timetable. Increasing spending to that level would require him to find more than €40 billion a year in France's tight public finances or raise taxes in a country that already bears the second-highest tax burden in the OECD. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is preparing at least a 2026 budget in which defense spending could rise from €80 billion to €110 billion, Deutsche Bank predicts. But that would only amount to around 2.4% of GDP, down from 2.1% in 2024.

Merz, at least, seems determined to turn the German Bundeswehr into the strongest conventional army in Europe. So far, no other EU leader has followed his lead in asking the European Commission for an exemption—using the so-called escape clause—from its deficit and debt rules. However, that option is open to all following Brussels' ReArm Europe Plan, which also created a €150 billion investment fund financed by joint loans.

Meanwhile, defense contractors are still waiting for actual orders that demonstrate that governments are serious about defense. Micael Johansson, CEO of the €23 billion Swedish Saab Group and head of the European defense industry lobby, has warned that companies are now waiting for long-term commitments from governments. Only then can they proceed with the huge investments needed to keep factories ready to ramp up production rapidly. Executives are the only customers of this industry, which does not rely on large inventories.

While public spending is lagging despite promises, private capital is showing interest in an industry that has long been shunned by mainstream investors, whether investment funds or venture capital. The military sector was long considered to fall short of basic environmental, social, and governance criteria. This is rapidly changing. Public sector entities such as the European Investment Bank have relaxed their regulations. Norwegian authorities are also considering relaxing the investment criteria for the country's sovereign wealth fund. And European startups active in the sector no longer seem to have difficulty finding funding, as seen in recent weeks with German startups Helsing and Quantum Systems, which have raised a total of €760 million thanks to their high valuations.

Some European NATO members, such as Hungary and Slovakia, have moved closer to Russia and may not join the rest in increasing the organization's spending target. But these two countries account for less than 2% of European defense budgets. The most serious problem comes from Italy and Spain, which last year allocated only 1.5% and 1.3% of their GDP to their military budgets, which together account for 12% of European spending. Rome and Madrid's threat perception is affected by their distance from the Russian front line, and both governments find it convenient to take advantage of each other's increased spending. Some pressure may be necessary, and it would be more effective if it came not only from Trump but also from other European capitals.

Ideally, European NATO members would genuinely commit to increasing defense budgets with a firmer timeframe. But no government is obliged to wait for an international agreement to strengthen its defense and security. For now, European governments sound like a chorus of soldiers shouting "March!" on an opera stage, going nowhere. They should stop singing and start marching.

The authors are columnists for Reuters Breakingviews . The opinions are their own. The translation, by Carlos Gómez Abajo , is the responsibility of CincoDías.