Libya: Putin's Allied Marshal Who Is a Threat to the EU

A fragile and unstable state with two governments. After the fall and death of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya faced internal divisions that culminated in a bloody civil war. After the ceasefire signed in 2020, the North African country attempted to organize elections to ensure internal peace. They never took place. Libya remains deeply divided, a state considered by many analysts to have failed. But there is one country that sees this as a valuable opportunity to exert its influence: Russia.

After the fall of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Moscow lost an important ally in the Middle East. In Syria, Russia controls the Tartus naval base and the Hmeimim air base, giving it a strong presence in the Mediterranean Sea. Although the new regime in Damascus has not yet officially ended cooperation with the Kremlin, this could happen at any moment, and there is pressure from the West to do so. Vladimir Putin's regime therefore needed to find a new alliance in the region—and now sees one of the Libyan governments as a reliable partner.

Libya currently has two governments in power. One, recognized by the United Nations (UN) and most of the international community, controls the western part of the country, including the capital, Tripoli. Led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, the Government of National Unity (GNU) enjoys legitimacy and an important regional ally: Turkey. To a lesser extent, the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US) also support it.

The second-in-command government controls eastern Libya, with Benghazi as its central city. This executive branch, which is neither recognized by the UN nor by most countries, is primarily controlled by a group of armed militias—the Libyan National Army—under the ironclad control of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Even without international support, the military controls vast areas of Libyan territory. Its main geopolitical support comes from neighboring Egypt and even Arab countries, such as the United Arab Emirates. However, the military also receives support from Russia.

Marshal Khalifa Haftar makes no secret of his close relationship with Moscow. He visited the Russian capital with Vladimir Putin in May of this year and sought to "strengthen military cooperation," cementing significant support. In turn, due to the cold relations maintained by the current Syrian regime, Russia is seeking to establish an ally with access to the Mediterranean Sea. Eastern Libya is an ideal location for this.

Furthermore, with its alliance with the Libyan marshal, Russia gains an opportunity to destabilize the European Union (EU). Eastern Libya is less than 300 kilometers from the islands of Gavdos and Crete, which belong to Greece. How can Moscow undermine the EU bloc? By exploiting migrants desperate to escape a failed state. In fact, in recent days, authorities have reported an increase in the number of people arriving on the Greek islands.

Interviewed by Observador, three experts have no doubt that this alliance can bear fruit. "The partnership between Russia and Haftar is built on desperation and mutual opportunities," says Anas El Gomati, a member of the Libyan think tank Sadeq Institute. This relationship, according to the analyst, is expected to "deepen" in the near future, increasing Russian military bases in eastern Libya and also posing a threat to the EU.

On May 9, 2025, an important day for Vladimir Putin's regime, commemorating the defeat of Nazi troops in World War II and gaining new symbolism after the invasion of Ukraine, Khalifa Haftar attended , along with two dozen foreign leaders, the Kremlin-organized military parade in Red Square. This is proof that, for Moscow, the intermediary in Libya is that marshal, not Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh.

Moscow's assistance to the marshal is not new. Tarek Megerisi, a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations think tank , told Observador that Russia has been supporting Khalifa Haftar's army since 2020. "Since the army was disbanded following the failed siege of Tripoli in 2020, Russia seized the opportunity to expand its influence in the territories the marshal previously controlled. In return, Russia helped rebuild the army," the expert recalls.

"Today, the Russians continue to exploit the dependence they created on Haftar," continues Tarek Megerisi. Russia offers "protection, military, and diplomatic support" to the army controlled by the marshal, which allows it to maintain control of several territories in eastern Libya and continue fighting against the government in Tripoli. In exchange, the military has transformed Libya into a "platform for all of Moscow's operations in Africa."

Tarek Megerisi emphasizes that this relationship is "unequal." Russia clearly has the greater power: "They are not equal partners in this relationship." In eastern Libya, Russia established military and naval bases and took advantage of the region's natural resources, particularly its oil reserves. Moscow primarily sent mercenaries from the Wagner militia and the successor group, the African Corps, to the region to establish Russian control.

The end of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria also encouraged Russia to intensify its military presence in Libya and strengthen ties with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. According to Anas El Gomati, this partnership is even more strategically ingenious than the one with Bashar al-Assad. "Russia gains access to Libya's energy infrastructure and a presence in the Mediterranean region, as well as strategic depth in the Sahel and Southern Europe."

Libya's geographic proximity to countries like Greece, Italy, and Malta could prove quite advantageous for Russia in helping to destabilize European Union countries. Moscow has agreements with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar that allow it to use ports in eastern Libya. This Russian presence also raises concerns about the possibility of conducting surveillance operations on NATO's southern flank.

Geopolitically, Khalifa Haftar's government proves to be an excellent ally for Russia. The leadership of the Libyan National Army maintains excellent relations with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Egyptian President Abdul Fatah Khalil Al-Sisi supports a marshal who seeks to impose a regime identical to his own—an authoritarian regime with a strong military presence combating radical Islamist forces—while the Emirati crown has economic interests in eastern Libya.

"For Russia, Haftar offers what Syria didn't: a gateway to Africa that doesn't collapse when a dictator falls. Libya's partners are important US allies —like the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—who will support Libya regardless of Western rhetoric about Russian influence," explains a member of the Libyan think tank Sadeq Institute. According to Anas El Gomati, Moscow has a partner it supports, which is also "supported by US regional partners."

For Marshal Haftar, Russian support gives "international legitimacy" to his military "authoritarianism." "The Russians support something the West would never advocate: power without accountability. Russian assistance comes without elections, without guarantees of human rights compliance, or the existence of democratic institutions," continues Anas El Gomati. The European Union, in contrast, tends to demand more from its allies.

The same expert has no doubt that the relationship will only improve in the future. After the invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions imposed by Western countries, Russia needs "reliable African partnerships" and support across all geographies. "Regarding Haftar, the marshal requires external support to try to control western Libya, which is more populous," emphasizes Anas El Gomati.

Still, this relationship could deteriorate. There are signs of growing tensions between the Libyan National Army led by the marshal and the African Corps. Geopolitically, Moscow's top priority remains the war in Ukraine . As a result, Russia, through the African Corps, has been unable to honor many of its commitments to Khalifa Haftar.

The military in Tripoli is wary of a possible lack of Russian support. Because their main ally is more focused on Ukraine, Marshal Khalifa Haftar and his allies have been trying to expand their network of influence. In recent months, he has met with Belarusian and even Turkish leaders, even though Turkey is the main supporter of the UN-recognized government.

When the new Syrian regime took power and Bashar al-Assad went to Moscow, the first movements began to be noticed. Ships and aircraft left Syria for Libya. The prime minister of the Government of National Unity sounded the alarm at the end of December . "We are concerned that international conflicts will spread to Libya. No one wants an external power imposing its hegemony and authority on a country and its people," warned Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh.

Since then, Russia has intensified its military presence. Initially, in late December, the Russians used (and refurbished) the Maaten al-Sarra air base, located in the middle of the Sahara Desert, near the Libyan-Chadian border. This already demonstrated that Russia was "repositioning its chess pieces in Africa" after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

Speaking to the international press , Anas El Gomati explained that Russia, while "losing Syrian air bases," was increasing its presence in Maaten al-Sarra , creating a "new network of influence stretching from the Mediterranean to Africa." From that base in the middle of the desert, Moscow was able to conduct flights to deliver weapons to other African allies or Russian mercenaries in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Sudan.

More recently, in late June, an investigation by French radio station RFI , based on satellite imagery, revealed that Russia is also using the Al-Khadim air base in northeastern Libya. At that facility, Moscow has been storing military equipment from Syria—which is then sold to other African countries. It would serve as a sort of Russian hub in Africa.

????????| The Maaten al-Sarra base in Libya continues to expand. Since March, the infrastructure development alongside the main runway has been significant. pic.twitter.com/AdFKtcTgZS

— Iván (@FpAnalisis) June 14, 2025

Military-wise, Italy's Agenza Nova reported that Russia was indeed considering installing missile systems at another air base in Sebha, in the middle of Libya. Moscow wanted to install missiles aimed directly at Europe. However, this hypothesis raises doubts among many analysts interviewed by Politico, who point more to a logistical use of these infrastructures.

In strategic terms for Europe, however, what worries most is the naval base in Tobruk , a city located in eastern Libya, about 175 kilometers from Egypt. In late December 2024, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto warned that "Moscow was transferring resources from the Syrian naval base in Tartus to Libya." "This is not a good thing. Russian ships and submarines in the Mediterranean are always a concern, even more so if they are a thousand kilometers away and just a stone's throw from us."

Russia has expressed interest in maintaining or even increasing its military presence in the Mediterranean Sea. Speaking to Observador, Basil Germond, professor of International Security at Lancaster University, stated that "with the loss of control of the Tartus naval base in Syria, Russia's presence in the Mediterranean and, by extension, in the Middle East and Africa, is jeopardized."

"Logistically, the loss of Tartus, combined with the closure of the Turkish Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits to its ships since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, has profoundly hampered Moscow's ability to conduct naval missions and support land operations" in the Mediterranean region, explains Basil Germond. It is in this context that the Tobruk naval base comes into play: "It is a way for Russia to secure access to naval facilities to support naval assets in the Mediterranean and forces deployed in Africa."

This military base in eastern Libya could therefore be a key point in Russia's new security strategy in the Mediterranean Sea, which is worrying European capitals. Even so, Basil Germond cautions that Tobruk "does not offer the same degree of stability as Tartus under the Assad regime and does not have the same level of ship repair and maintenance facilities."

In the Mediterranean Sea, Russia's strategy also consists of sowing chaos near the European Union and NATO. By fully controlling the Tobruk naval base (so far, as far as we know, it only has a partnership with Khalifa Haftar), this will pose a threat to southern European bases, particularly those in Greece and Italy.

For now, the warnings are limited to the migration issue. In the past, Moscow has also used the same tactics. "We've already seen that Libyan migration was used as a weapon against Europe. Russia also helped Syrian migrants reach Europe through Belarus," Tarek Megerisi recalled, adding other Russian hybrid operations: "Russia has already helped undermine Europe through Libya, contributing to Libyan instability and using Libya as a vehicle for military and disinformation operations aimed at reducing Europe's influence in sub-Saharan Africa."

Given this modus operandi that has been used in the past, Tarek Megerisi has no doubts: "It is entirely logical that the instrumentalization of migrants from Libya will continue to worsen as relations between Russia and Europe worsen and Ukraine becomes a Russian swamp."

As with geopolitical issues, Libya still offers more opportunities for Russia than Syria. "Russia has already demonstrated that it uses migration as a weapon through Belarus," says Anas El Gomati, recalling the arrival of thousands of migrants at the border between Belarus, Poland, and the Baltic countries between 2021 and 2022.

"Libya has greater potential due to its geography [being closer to Europe] and Haftar's territorial control. Through Libya's eastern coast and southern border regions, Russia can manipulate migration waves while maintaining sufficient openness to deny originating these processes," explains Anas El Gomati, adding that Russia can use two tactics: "Facilitate immigration to pressure Europe, or position Haftar as a stability partner."

Greece and Italy have already discussed the issue within the European Union. The two countries, among those most affected by the escalating migration crisis from Libya, have already warned the remaining member states of the potential negative consequences of this situation. "Libya is an emergency that Europe must face together," stated Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani.

Greece, for its part, has already taken the first steps. The government led by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis also emphasized that the country is experiencing an "emergency situation," necessitating the adoption of "exceptional measures." The prime minister therefore decided to "suspend all asylum applications from migrants arriving aboard boats from North Africa for three months." " All migrants entering illegally will be arrested. The passage to Greece is closed."

According to the Greek Coast Guard, more than 10,000 people have already arrived on the island of Crete alone. Since June, the number of arrivals has increased, with local authorities warning that reception facilities are overcrowded. In a message to migrants, Greek Migration Minister Thanos Plevris urged them to "stay where they are" and warned them that they will not be welcome in Greece.

A Greek official confided to Politico that this new Greek legislation has already sparked interest among several ministers, who view the exceptional measures as among the harshest ever implemented in a member state. This has already led to several requests for bilateral meetings with Minister Thanos Plevris, in order to better understand the new framework.

Anas El Gomati told Observador that Libya's geographic location is, in fact, a "perfect pressure point" for Europe. "It's close enough to Europe to create a crisis, [the political situation] is chaotic enough to conceal what's happening, and the country is divided enough for Russia to operate through proxies ," the same expert notes.

At a time when European public opinion is becoming increasingly aware of the migration issue, Anas El Gomati warns that "European politicians, desperate to manage" this issue, are becoming "hostages" to a dynamic created by Russia. "It's the instrumentalization of human desperation for strategic gain —not only to move people, but also to manipulate European fears to achieve certain political objectives."

Along with the Migration Ministers of Greece, Italy, and Malta, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, met with the Prime Minister of the Government of National Unity in early July. The leader of the UN-recognized Libyan government promised to "launch a broad national campaign with the support of several friendly countries to combat human trafficking."

However well-intentioned Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh's promises may be, they are not enough to manage the situation in the European Union. Above all, EU leaders need to speak with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar , Vladimir Putin's ally. After meeting with the UN-recognized prime minister, the commissioner and European ministers attempted to go to Benghazi to negotiate with the leader of eastern Libya.

But the European leaders were not received by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. After visiting Tripoli with Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, the European delegation was barred from Benghazi—and Magnus Brunner was even considered "persona non grata." According to those close to the military leader who governs eastern Libya, the European Union leaders and ministers violated a series of "diplomatic practices."

The diplomatic incident was a show of force by Khalifa Haftar—the marshal knows that European leaders are interested in speaking with him, as he is the only one who can stop a migration crisis. The military officer seeks recognition of his government by the European Union and uses the migration issue as a bargaining chip. "It was just a ploy on Haftar's part to try to legitimize his government and the civilian face of his military dictatorship," Tarek Megerisi told Euronews.

Given that only the government in Tripoli is recognized by the UN, should European leaders speak to Khalifa Haftar, who—in the eyes of many—is considered a separatist leader in Libya? The dilemma is not easily resolved: on the one hand, the European Union wants to avoid worsening a migration crisis; on the other, they risk being exploited by a leader who has not been internationally legitimized.

In an interview with Politico , even after being expelled from Benghazi, Magnus Brunner argued that negotiations with Khalifa Haftar are necessary, confirming that "communication channels are open at the technical level and working very well." "The fact that Russia is increasing its influence in Libya is worrying, and that is why we must engage with Libya. There is certainly a danger that Russia will use the migration issue as a weapon against Europe. The instrumentalization is ongoing," the commissioner argued.

Vladimir Putin's influence in Libya leaves the European Union no choice but to act and engage with Khalifa Haftar, believes Magnus Brunner, assuring that the EU has already forgotten the diplomatic incident. "We are ready for talks at any time. In my view, it is urgently necessary," argued the European Commissioner for Migration.

The question now is whether Khalifa Haftar wants to speak with European leaders. On the one hand, the marshal needs international legitimacy, military support, since his ally is focused on Ukraine, and to continue the fight against the Tripoli government, which he considers illegitimate. On the other, the European Union will embark on a path with a leader who has more than just "tactical cooperation" with Russia. As Anas El Gomati defines it, Moscow has a relationship of "strategic codependency that feeds on the division of Libya," a state seen by many as failed and where healing internal divisions will be very difficult.