Reform and Rupture: How Portugal Can Learn from Javier Mil

Javier Milei's administration in Argentina offers, for attentive and responsible observers, a set of complex lessons, some useful and others disturbing. An economist by profession and a libertarian by conviction, Milei advocates for a minimal state and came to the presidency with a disruptive promise: to dismantle the foundations of the Argentine state as it was known, radically cut public spending, and free the economy from what we might call "statist shackles." Although Portugal does not share the same institutional and economic collapse that characterized pre-Milei Argentina, we have clear signs that the current state model in Portugal requires serious, phased, rational, and courageous reform. However, this reform cannot—and should not—sacrifice the welfare state that sustains collective dignity and national cohesion.

Since taking office in December 2023, Javier Milei has adopted a radical austerity agenda, popularly known as the "Chainsaw Plan." This consisted, among other measures, of reducing the number of ministries, laying off tens of thousands of public employees, eliminating energy, transportation, and food subsidies, repealing hundreds of economic and labor regulations, and attempting to broadly liberalize the economy through presidential decrees. The fiscal results were immediate: the primary deficit was eliminated, the state's influence on the economy was significantly reduced, and international reserves began to recover. However, the social cost was profound: inflation, although partially controlled, remained high; the poverty rate peaked above 50% in early 2024—estimated at between 52% and 57%, according to various sources—but declined in the following months, currently standing between 33% and 38%, according to official and private data. unemployment has increased considerably, acutely affecting the middle class and the most vulnerable sectors of society.

This is precisely where the critical frontier for any serious analysis lies: reform cannot be confused with destruction. Milei's merit lies in clearly exposing the distortions of a parasitic, bureaucratized state, captured by private interests.

But their mistake—a serious one—was assuming that state efficiency could only be achieved by the near-total eradication of its social functions. The result was not a healthy and liberal economy, but rather a society in turmoil, where trust in democratic institutions is dangerously eroded. Portugal, in its own way, also lives trapped by a "fat" state, prone to cronyism and functional inertia.

Public administration lacks rigorous performance assessment, current expenditure consumes resources that are scarce for strategic investment, and political culture often avoids addressing necessary structural reforms. Therefore, there are lessons to be learned from Milei's disruptive approach—especially regarding the urgency of reforms—but they must be adopted with prudence, respect for constitutional balances, and a commitment to social justice. Reform of the Portuguese State must, therefore, be based on a balanced strategy that preserves the essential core of the Social State while promoting its modernization and sustainability. In this sense, proposals such as the following can and should be considered:

• Merger or extinction of redundant public entities , based on independent audits and objective performance criteria.

• Creation of a public service evaluation system that promotes merit, ongoing training and accountability.

• Full digitalization of public services , reducing bureaucracy and increasing the efficiency of citizen service.

• Restructuring social support to ensure it is effective, targeted, and free from chronic waste. • Tax reform that eases the burden on labor and production, while strengthening the fight against tax evasion and fraud.

• Simplification of administrative rules and review of regulatory codes with a view to promoting productive private investment.

These proposals do not imply a weakening of the State's role, but rather its qualification. A State that knows how to manage, that regulates intelligently, that invests judiciously, and that protects those in true need is not a big State—it is a fair State. And this is what Portugal should aspire to: not the uncritical importation of foreign models, but the construction of its own reformist path, informed by reason and guided by responsibility. Indeed, Portugal's reformist ambition cannot be confused with the simple emulation of exogenous paradigms that fail to respect the specificity of our social contract. Portuguese political history, marked by a constant effort at institutional construction, by civilizational advances in social rights, and by a development model rooted in intergenerational solidarity, cannot be sacrificed in the name of callous technocratism or extreme liberal experimentalism. The challenge, therefore, is to reinvent the State without deconstructing it, to perfect it without amputating it, to endow it with new capabilities without relinquishing its essential functions.

The crisis of the contemporary state—visible in citizen distrust, capture by organized interests, and operational slowness—demands a response that combines budgetary rigor with strategic vision, and public authority with democratic proximity. This necessarily implies a change in political culture. Good governance does not reside solely in institutional reforms; it resides, above all, in a conception of public service as a mission of collective interest and not as an extension of partisan struggle or corporate privilege.

And it also implies recovering an almost forgotten idea: that the State is, ultimately, a moral instrument. It is the organized expression of the common will to guarantee dignity, freedom, and opportunity for all, not just those most adapted to the market. In this context, the most profound lesson that can be drawn from the Argentine experience under Milei is that the destruction of fragile institutions does not, in itself, generate strong institutions. Replacing state dysfunction with a political and social vacuum can be more dangerous than the original inefficiency itself. Portugal must, therefore, protect itself from this trap: reform, yes; dismantle, no. Improve, yes; devastate, never. The great task of the coming years will, therefore, be to build a new paradigm of State: a reformed State, competent, agile, and attentive; but also supportive, ethical, and present. This will be the true measure of the maturity of a European nation in the 21st century.

And it is with this measure—demanding but fair—that Portugal must evaluate its path. Ultimately, this reflection is also deeply personal. As a citizen, as a keen observer of political reality, and as someone who believes in the regenerative power of institutions, I refuse to accept the idea that the only alternative to stagnation is the implosion of the system. I do not believe in chainsaw revolutions, nor in incendiary speeches that confuse authority with violence and freedom with abandonment. I do believe in a demanding politics, built on responsibility, competence, and moral courage.

I see in Argentina's example not a blind inspiration, but a mirror that challenges us: it shows us how far a country can go when the balance between efficiency and equity is lost. And at the same time, it reminds us that inertia is as costly as radicalism. Portugal doesn't need saviors—it needs statesmen. It's not necessary to tear everything down—we need to reform with intelligence, firmness, and integrity. The future depends on what we are capable of reforming before despair reforms us. And this responsibility—collective, but also deeply individual—should mobilize all who still believe that the State is not the enemy, but the mirror of our democratic maturity. I want a lighter Portugal, yes—but not more fragile. I want a more effective State—but never indifferent. I want a country that changes—but without ever ceasing to be fair.