Justice in Córdoba: almost all foreigners

The original Constitution of the Province of Córdoba (CP), from 1923, was replaced (literally) in 1987. Vox populi , the main political objective was to allow the reelection of the then governor, a previously prohibited option. Article 136 of the current CP allows for it.

Eduardo Angeloz led the province for three terms, the last of which was unconstitutional. A twisted interpretation, endorsed by the Superior Court of Justice (TSJ) he appointed, characterized his second term as the "first" under the new Constitution. Thus, he served another term, which, numerically curious, was his third. The population elected him, ignoring this irregularity.

The new Constitution expanded the number of members of the Supreme Court of Justice. It would no longer be five, as before, but seven (Article 164), which allowed for the promotion of lawyers from the opposition party whose votes sided with the majority in the Constitutional Convention.

The most significant reform concerned the functioning of the "Public Ministry" (Articles 171 et seq.), which was headed by an Attorney General. With the disappearance of the former TSJ prosecutor, a new head emerged to lead a more prominent (and far too prominent) structure. The new head serves "five years and may be reappointed." He is appointed by the Executive Branch "with the prior approval of the Senate," which no longer exists.

The Unicameral thing is a story worthy of a miniseries.

Successive governors appointed seven attorneys general, and none were reappointed. Angeloz and Ramón Mestre were the last Radicals to lead the province, and then José Manuel de la Sota and Juan Schiaretti alternated, until today's appointment of Martín Llaryora.

Angelocismo conceived a modern constitution with positive aspects; at the same time, it included critical and much-debated issues, in the belief that it would govern eternally. Furthermore, a new Code of Criminal Procedure was passed (Law 8.123).

This combination gave the ruling party advantages that, once Ramón Bautista Mestre's reelection was frustrated (while he was fighting with everyone, days before the elections), the triumphant Peronism took advantage of.

It seems politicians forget to legislate for everyone, impartially and without pettiness. If they did, no matter who wins, the laws would benefit (or harm) only one beneficiary: society. The current ruling party has been imitating that old radicalism for more than 25 years. Let's admit that there is coherence.

Twice, a career official, a provincial "judicial" official, was appointed Attorney General. One, allied with the Executive Branch that appointed him, clashed with the Supreme Court of Justice and half of the Judiciary; the other, an investigating prosecutor, entered politics upon retirement. The others were either a federal prosecutor, who "lent" him to us, keeping him in office, only to return only to retire and discover his political leanings; or licensed lawyers, that is, private defenders of alleged criminals (all are innocent until proven guilty) who entered "through the window," or directly, and this is worrying, officials of the Executive Branch, especially unknown in the criminal court system. They were never prestigious jurists or experts in court matters with recognized influence over their (new) subordinates.

There was someone who lasted only a short time and fled his post surrounded by scandal. The others returned to their law firms, which they never closed, with the luster—which they proudly displayed—of being "FORMER" (with bold capital letters) attorneys general, which increased their clientele. Their colleagues continued serving the interests of those who later returned to private practice.

At one point, a lawyer who was barred from litigating for five years because he was the Attorney General had to recuse himself in cases involving a "former" (no capital letters) client whom he had previously defended and now found himself on the other side. Not necessarily on the other side, let's say.

No governor has nominated a chamber prosecutor, judge, or magistrate for the position, whether active or retired (with the exceptions cited). It's hard to accept that being a litigator or an executive branch official better qualifies one to command prosecutors than spending decades in the judiciary. Could it be that judicial officials are qualified for their duties, but not for leading those who perform those duties? They are not qualified to reach the top of the Public Ministry.

In short: political officials and private attorneys make better chief prosecutors than the prosecutors or judges themselves, according to the governors.

The above applies to deputy prosecutors, who hold office for life. At 70 years old, retired as a criminal judge, he would not return to the courts, so no personal interest motivates these lines. However, there are many former prosecutors, judges, advisors, judges, and judges qualified to lead the gigantic Public Prosecutor's Office. This statement also does not conceal corporate biases.

They will never be considered, for reasons only the governors know. We don't know, but suspicions abound. As if that weren't enough, they created an enormous structure headed by a Public Defender and four deputies. They will be the heads of the official public defenders. Will they order these officials to defend their rights? In any case, we, the citizens of Córdoba, are already supporting this new corporation with our taxes.

Hopefully, the Bar Association won't be infected by inventing a commander of private defense attorneys. As a consolation, let's recognize that the cost would be borne by them, not the taxpayers of Córdoba. Not to mention the proposed Court of Cassation, a huge, expensive structure that some propose to create.

To think that someone, not long ago, said: “There is no money.”

He wasn't from Cordoba, of course.

• Lawyer; former member of the Third Criminal Chamber of Córdoba