German expert: Ukraine's sovereignty is the most important thing

After the meeting in Alaska and the leaders' meeting in the White House, can Putin be happy or worried?

The war in Ukraine is a major setback for Russia, if not more. There's no way Putin will be able to achieve the maximalist goals he initially set out to achieve. Depending on the shape of a future agreement, if one is reached at all, Putin could, however, sell it as a success for domestic consumption.

He might argue that meeting with Trump demonstrates his prestige. He might say that, in essence, the "special war operation" against Ukraine was a confrontation with the entire West, and that Russia fared militarily well in it, preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. He might not say the goal was to rebuild the empire, but to return Russia to the world stage.

Does this mean that Putin will be ready to end war?

A key factor will be whether the United States will put enough pressure on Russia to give it the impression that the costs of continuing the war will be much higher than before.

This involves an announcement of massive support for Ukraine if Russia refuses to cease fighting. While President Trump and his team have occasionally floated such a possibility, it would require a firm component of the negotiations, including a commitment from Washington to continue or even strengthen aid for Kyiv.

It seems that the US administration has so far used positive forms of persuasion, avoiding the proverbial stick in its relations with Moscow. It's possible that the Russian leader will conclude that a cessation of hostilities is beneficial to him, as the country needs a respite, and that a major agreement negotiated with Washington will provide a temporary reset with the US and weaken Europe.

Is it possible to reach an agreement After the war ends, NATO troops may appear in Ukraine as part of the security guarantee – following the example of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty?

Establishing NATO guarantees for Ukraine without NATO membership would be a political and diplomatic masterpiece. However, in practice, constructing such a political and military umbrella would require considerable courage and commitment from Western countries, as well as firm declarations from the US. Therefore, perhaps the solution will not be security clauses in the strict sense, but rather a package of various elements, including mechanisms for mandatory financial or military support for Ukraine, as well as a Western military presence there.

In this sense, the presence of NATO forces in Ukraine would be just one factor in guaranteeing security. However, this is an extremely complex matter, and everything depends on the willingness of European countries to send and maintain their troops there. Various scenarios exist, ranging from a symbolic deployment of such forces in western Ukraine to the presence of significant forces along the front lines. US support would be crucial to the implementation of such a scenario. However, President Trump is not ready to send American troops.

What about the presence of Polish troops in this situation? army?

It seems that Poland should be there. However, it's understandable that there's some reticence in Poland on this issue. It's clear that in a "coalition of the willing" supporting Ukraine, each member's contribution may vary. Poland, however, has a legitimate role to play in shaping European security and strengthening Ukraine. Of course, Polish troops could become targets of Russian attacks and provocations, but the same applies to other contingents. In my opinion, if Germany decides to take such a step, Poland should do the same.

Is the future solution peace deal could resemble the Korean scenario? A demilitarized zone is being created, and Kyiv is not giving up. no de jure territories, but accepts the fact that they remain under occupation.

It cannot be ruled out that such a solution will be accepted at the negotiating table. For Ukraine, and for most European countries as well, it is important that there be no formal territorial cessions to the aggressor. Rather, the goal would be to establish a line drawn based on the facts. The Ukrainian president could accept this, arguing that he had no other choice and that there was no possibility of forcing through more favorable terms. Regardless of the political content and legal provisions of a potential agreement, the most important thing is that it be stable. In Korea, we are dealing with a permanent provisional arrangement, the stability of which is guaranteed by the fear of the consequences of its violation. These are purely theoretical considerations.

Let's assume the war ends. When should we expect reconstruction of Nord Stream from Russia to Germany?

Germany's period of naivety in its treatment of Russia is now a thing of the past. However, there are still voices that Russia will not disappear and that sooner or later some kind of arrangement will have to be made with it. I believe the Zeitenwende policy will continue in the form of strengthening the Bundeswehr and increasing defense spending in line with NATO requirements. The presence of a Bundeswehr brigade in Lithuania will also be maintained. However, I don't rule out a return to the old concepts of building relations with Russia on two pillars: deterrence and dialogue within the framework of Germany's role in NATO and the EU. However, there may be doubts: if the Americans begin to shape their relations with Moscow, why should Europe and Germany continue their policy of isolating it? Everything depends on whether Russia is willing to conclude an agreement and respect it.

Will Putin resign if an agreement is reached? from plans to subordinate Ukraine to Russia?

There's no reason for this. It long-term seeks to revise the order created by NATO and EU enlargement. It wants to limit the West's presence in Russia's immediate vicinity, an area it considers its geopolitical foreground. Even if it signs an agreement, it will be merely a symbolic step. It will only adhere to it if it deems its violation would provoke a decisive Western reaction.