Between freedom and censorship

The early development of the independent Ukrainian media market in the post-Soviet period was closely linked to the formation of Ukraine’s “patronal” political system and its infiltration by the interests of big business and its owners.[1] The media sector became a central arena in the power struggle between several major clans, which competed for political influence and economic preferences with the help of, among others, broadcasting and the press.[2] In this respect, Ukraine differed fundamentally from most other Central and Eastern European countries. In Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, Western ownership came to characterise many large media companies after 1991.[3]

In Ukraine, by contrast, domestic financial and industrial conglomerates created a kind of national cartel in the media market and prevented the entry of foreign capital. As a result, a handful of large domestic media groups, which included the most popular television channels, radio stations and print media, set the country’s news agenda and largely shaped public debate. [4] The five most important ones before 2022 were:

• Inter Media Group, which included the Inter and NTN television channels, owned by Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin;
• 1+1 media, which included the television channels 1+1 and Ukraine Today , owned by Ihor Kolomoyskyy;
• StarLightMedia (Starlight Media after 2021), which included the television channels ICTV, STB and Novyy (Novo), owned by Viktor and Olena Pinchuk (son-in-law and daughter of former President Leonid Kuchma);
• Media Group «Ukraina», which included the television channels Ukraina and Ukraina24, owned by Rinat Akhmetov; and
• the television stations Priamyy (Direct) and Channel 5, owned by former President Petro Poroshenko.

Pro-Russian politician Viktor Medvedchuk, whose daughter is Vladimir Putin’s goddaughter, began building a media group in Ukraine a few years before the Russian invasion began in 2014. The shares in this group were formally owned by a confidant of Medvedchuk, former Verkhovna Rada deputy Taras Kozak. Medvedchuk’s media holding included television stations such as 112 Ukraina, NewsOne and ZIK, which sometimes openly and sometimes less openly adopted pro-Russian positions. Amid escalating tensions between Kyiv and Moscow in late 2021, the coverage of these channels was classified by Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council as a threat to the country’s national security, and they were shut down.[5]

The victory of Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the 2019 presidential election and of his Servant of the People party in the parliamentary elections of the same year marked the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian domestic politics.[6] The new leadership’s agenda included so-called “de-oligarchization.” Ukraine’s “plutocrats” were to be deprived, in Zelenskyy’s words, of their “concentrated media resources, opaque access to strategic assets, and their “krysha” [literally: “roof,” or patronage] in the government.”

From the ashes of the media oligarchy

Under the pressure of the war, the largest television stations, which had previously belonged to competing media groups, merged to form a single channel.[8] After broadcasting their own special programmes on the first day of the invasion, Starlight Media, 1+1 media and Inter Media, as well as the Ukrainian parliamentary television station, Rada, began broadcasting the 24-hour news and political commentary programme Telemarathon, “Edyni novyny” (United News), on 25 February 2022. The unified television channel provides time slots for the editorial teams of the member stations, which they fill with their own presenters, programmes and reports. Media Group “Ukraina” and the public broadcaster National Public Tele-Radio Company of Ukraine, better known as Suspilne movlennia (Public Broadcaster), also joined Telemarathon. However, the public broadcaster abandoned the United News project in May 2024 and now operates in parallel with Telemarathon.

The creation of Telemarathon was initially well received by both the public and the journalistic community. In the first months of the war, the joint programming of the previously separate stations played an important role in preserving the cohesion of Ukrainian society. In addition, in parallel with the Ukrainian-language Telemarathon, since August 2022 the Ukrainian government has also been broadcasting a 24-hour Russian-language news channel called “Freedom” via satellite and YouTube, which is a continuation of previous projects, UATV and “Dom” (Home), created in 2015. The existence of this Ukrainian state-run project in Russian contradicts the Kremlin’s propaganda narrative about the “Kiev regime’s” ruthless repression of the Russian language. Despite having existed since 2015, the operation of this Russian-language channel has been largely ignored by foreign critical coverage of the developments in the linguistic situation in Ukraine since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war on 20 February 2014, either through ignorance or deliberate intent.

At the same time, the Ukrainian state has been restricting the television news space since the beginning of the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022. Thus, several television stations associated with the opposition or Poroshenko’s circle – such as Channel 5 and Priamyy, as well as Espreso TV, which belongs to the son of businessman Kostiantyn Zhevaho – were deliberately and ostentatiously excluded from the joint Telemarathon programme. In addition, the digital broadcasting of these channels was stopped on 4 April 2022 without any explanation.[9] Since then, they have only been accessible via the Internet or satellite, as well as, in part, via foreign cable broadcasts.

Over time, the Telemarathon has come under increasing criticism.[10] A year after the start of the war, Ukrainian media experts suggested that the unified format had exhausted itself.[11] Critics say one problem is that the state spends considerable sums on funding the Telemarathon every year. In 2024, for example, around 465 million UAH (10.5 million euros) was provided from the state budget. Furthermore, the Telemarathon is no longer seen by viewers as an objective source of information. While 69% of the Ukrainian population trusted United News in the year of its inception, according to a Ukraine-wide survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS), this figure had almost halved, to 36%, by 2024.[12]

In its 2024 report on EU enlargement, the European Commission criticised Kyiv’s leadership on Telemarathon, noting that Ukraine would need to build a pluralistic media landscape if it wanted to become an EU member.[13] The Commission’s report expressed concerns about United News’ government funding and lack of objectivity. Culture and Strategic Communications Minister Mykola Tochytskyy, appointed in 2024, responded that the Commission’s recommendations regarding United News would be taken into account. However, the plan was only to “stop supporting Telemarathon after the end of martial law and then focus on the sustainable development of the media infrastructure”.[14]

Other points of view are presented by non-Telemarathon television channels that take a critical view of the government. These include Espreso TV and channels formerly owned by Poroshenko, which remain close to him today. Before the 2022 invasion, the former president had taken steps to limit his control over his broadcasting empire. He sold his media outlets, including Channel 5 and Priamyy, to the Vilni media holding company (Free Media) in November 2021, but retains indirect influence over them.[15]

The war did not only affect the domestic television market. There were even greater changes in other media sectors. Regional and local newspapers, television channels and websites, especially in Russian-occupied areas or near the frontline, were severely affected by the war. According to the most recent reliable data from the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine in 2022, about 15% of television and radio stations – mainly in eastern and southern Ukraine – ceased broadcasting due to Russian aggression, and many print titles were also closed.[16]

The market for printed newspapers and magazines has come to a virtual standstill. Today, there is not a single national printed periodical focusing on serious social and political issues, such as the daily Gazeta po-ukrainskyy , nor a single printed political magazine with regular editions, such as the weekly Ukrainskyy tyzhden (Ukrainian Week). Most are now fully online, and some, such as NV.ua, have become multimedia platforms producing texts, videos and podcasts. These new companies usually use multiple channels to distribute content and have not only a website, but also their own accounts on Telegram, Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, etc.

On the other hand, the online media market is developing rapidly, and a number of high-quality analytical portals and news websites operate in accordance with professional standards and ethical principles. These media outlets are mainly those included in the so-called White List compiled by the Ukrainian NGO Institute of Mass Information (IMI) based on an audit of compliance with professional standards. The following media outlets were included in this list in the second half of 2024: Suspilne, Ukrainska Pravda, NV.ua, Radio Svoboda, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, Babel, Hromadske, Teksty, Hromadske radio, Espreso TV, Slovo i dilo, Graty and Ukrainskyy tyzhden.[17]

In terms of media consumption, traditional radio and print continued to decline in popularity during the war. On the other hand, social media entities saw an increase in popularity. According to the annual survey conducted by the InMind Agency on behalf of the Ukrainian branch of Internews and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the vast majority of Ukrainians consumed news primarily through social media in 2024 (84%). Significantly fewer used news websites or television (30%), radio (12%), or print media (5%). For the first time since the 2022 invasion, respondents’ trust in the media fell in the fall of 2024 to less than half of respondents (47%).[18]

The biggest challenge for traditional media today is competition from social media. The Internews/USAID survey mentioned above found that Telegram is now the main news provider in Ukraine. By 2024, 73% of Ukrainians surveyed used this platform to stay informed about current events. YouTube came in second with 19%.

Telegram's political channels have gained an ever-growing audience since the invasion. According to a survey conducted in December 2022 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KMIS) for the Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication (UMCI), 63.3% of Ukrainians started using Telegram channels to receive political news after February 24, 2022, while only 35.9% did so before the large-scale invasion. Against the backdrop of the escalating war, a large number of partially anonymous Telegram channels have been created, which in some cases reach millions of subscribers.

Telegram’s enormous popularity can be explained by its design’s suitability for a war situation. In the aforementioned UMCI/KMIS survey, 41% of respondents said that Telegram channels are useful because they are easy to use; 39% value them for providing timely information about missile/drone launches and possible impact times/areas; and 37.6% appreciate them for their speed. Another 23.5% of respondents use Telegram channels because they publish news that is not available in traditional media.[19]

On the other hand, the new prominence of partially anonymous Telegram channels has facilitated the spread of disinformation and has become a tool for influencing public opinion. Telegram’s founder, Pavel Durov, is Russian, which, from a Ukrainian perspective, increases the risk of cooperation with Russian intelligence services and the transfer of Ukrainian users’ data to Russia. Most of the Telegram channels with millions of users analyzed in the UMCI study only partially disclose their sources of information, if at all, and also ignore other ethical and journalistic standards. The style of news presentation in anonymous Telegram channels ranges from informative and factual to highly emotional, and occasionally contains obscenities or even hate speech.

Despite criticism of Telegram from media experts, civil society organizations, parliamentarians, and the government, official channels of public institutions began to appear on Telegram after February 24, 2022, including representatives of state bodies and local governments. These various public actors were following a dominant social trend. The proliferation of the social network has also forced traditional media outlets to create their own channels on Telegram. Even the military now communicates with the public via Telegram.

The paradox of the success of the Telegram strategy is that government agencies responsible for information policy and state security agencies have repeatedly highlighted the risk that this network poses to the country. The head of Ukraine’s military intelligence service (HUR), Kyrylo Budanov, for example, considers Telegram a threat to Ukrainian national security.[20] Among other things, Russian intelligence services have used certain Telegram channels to recruit young Ukrainians for acts of sabotage, such as setting fire to vehicles of the Ukrainian armed forces.[21]

How war changed the media business

Large media groups are also moving away from traditional television towards various digital formats, broadcasting not only via satellite but also via cable, video channels, the Internet and live streaming. Using these methods, Starlight Media, for example, generated revenues of UAH 300 million, or about 7 million euros, from distributing entertainment content via YouTube in 2024. The total revenue of the company’s digital division amounted to about half a billion hryvnias in 2024, which is approximately three times more than in 2023.[22] The media group has created and developed more than 100 YouTube channels with almost 50 million subscribers and now translates its content into English, Spanish, Portuguese and Polish.

Ukrainian broadcasters are also trying to monetize content produced in previous years in new ways, making increasing use of free ad-supported streaming television (FAST). These live channels are funded by advertising and broadcast over the Internet. In the Ukrainian market, FAST is often used by channels to rebroadcast popular old content and remarket it through an over-the-top (OTT) media service, which is a multimedia streaming service offered to viewers directly over the Internet, bypassing cable, terrestrial and satellite television platforms.

Other prominent forms of fundraising include grants from international organisations and crowdfunding – an approach used in particular by independent and regional media. In the first half of 2022, for example, crowdfunding campaigns and donations raised over €2.2 million for six months of operations for 13 domestic media companies, covering around 60% of their needs for this period. The beneficiaries were Ukrainska Pravda, NV.ua, Liga, Ukrainer, Hromadske, Detektor media, Bihus.info, Slidstvo.Info, Zaborona, Dzerkalo tyzhnia, The Village Ukraine, Forbes and Babel.[23]

War-related and other restrictions

Kiev did not introduce direct government censorship of independent media outlets after the imposition of martial law in 2022; only certain restrictions were imposed on Ukrainian media outlets. The then commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyy, issued an order outlining these limits at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion. The order specified the method of accreditation of media representatives during the state of emergency, defined a list of militarily sensitive information about the troops and their operations that should not be disclosed, and regulated the work of journalists on the front lines and the broadcasting of visual material.[24]

Before the invasion, Ukraine had adopted one of the most progressive laws on access to public information, opening most state registers and the databases of ministries and other government agencies to investigative journalists and other interested parties. However, following the declaration of martial law, access to government information has been restricted. Authorities often fail to meet deadlines for processing requests from journalists and citizens or for posting public information on official websites.[25] For example, 51% of journalists surveyed in 2023 complained about authorities’ refusal to provide socially important information, and 17% complained about failure to grant accreditation.[26]

The bulk of financial assistance to Ukrainian media outlets was provided by the US government through USAID and other organizations until early 2025. The decision by the administration of newly elected US President Donald J. Trump to end all non-military support programs worldwide, including in Ukraine, has had a negative impact on independent Ukrainian media outlets. First of all, it affects small regional newsrooms, especially those that have been relocated from temporarily occupied regions or those located in the combat zone.[27] The decision will also have negative consequences for investigative journalism.

According to media expert Galyna Piskorska, “80% of Ukrainian media outlets were receiving funding through USAID. […] Without donor assistance or state budget support by 2025, newspapers and magazines could decline by another 20% in Ukraine, while subscription circulation could drop by 25–30%.”[28] According to a survey of 120 newsrooms, 7.5% had begun to reduce staff following the suspension of US funding in February 2025, 9.5% were struggling with office rent, 11% were reducing content production, and 10.5% were cutting salaries and switching to part-time work.[29] This dependence on foreign funding may seem unhealthy, but Ukraine’s war economy offers few alternatives for non-entertainment media outlets to make money and grow.

The end of USAID funding will not only negatively impact the pluralism of the Ukrainian media landscape, but could also weaken freedom of expression in Eastern Europe more generally. Ukrainian media experts expect Russia to step up its disinformation and propaganda campaigns, given the Trump administration’s withdrawal of support for projects aimed at combating disinformation. Activists in Kyiv are already noticing that the Chinese government is stepping in to fill the void left by USAID in Ukraine. Furthermore, the position of Russia and other disruptive powers has been strengthened by the decision of tech giants like Meta to weaken their fact-checking and review mechanisms, which were created in response to the spread of fake news and hate speech. This creates a new reality and new challenges for Ukrainian media outlets and individual journalists.

Conclusions and recommendations

The functions and functioning of Ukrainian media have fundamentally changed after February 24, 2022. The former oligarch-controlled channels have disappeared and have been partially merged into the state-funded Telemarathon, United News. The remaining independent broadcasters, news agencies, web portals and periodicals have had to reinvent themselves and look for new audiences, publication formats, communication channels and sources of funding. The importance of social media – especially Telegram – has skyrocketed. The media landscape has become less open due to the presence of military censorship, government centralization and political self-censorship.

Despite these and other challenges arising from wartime conditions and martial law in force since 2022, Ukrainian public discourse nevertheless remains essentially pluralistic. According to a sociological survey of journalists conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in cooperation with the ZMINA Human Rights Center in 2023, journalists rated the state of freedom of expression at 6.4 on a 10-point scale, with 10 being very good.[30]

Diversity of opinion has been ensured, among other factors, by:

• the functioning of the public broadcaster Suspilne movlennia
• the diversity of online media and their independent funding
• the many uncontrolled Telegram channels
• the dissemination of political information through various other media
• the presence of investigation teams in various media outlets
• the presence of non-governmental organizations that monitor state bodies, and
• virtually unrestricted public debate on controversial issues.

However, the media situation in Ukraine is neither satisfactory nor stable. It requires greater attention from national and international stakeholders.

In this context, the Ukrainian Government should, in cooperation with Ukrainian civil society:

• restructure or replace Telemarathon in order to make this channel or a substitute more acceptable to Ukrainian viewers, media monitoring organisations and the European Union;
• grant licenses to other Ukrainian television and radio stations approved by civil society in order to allow them full access to all communication networks;
• support, as far as possible, regional and local media with licensing, logistics and cooperation;
• intensify ongoing campaigns to alert Ukrainian social media users about the various problems and risks associated with popular networks such as Telegram and TikTok.

Western governmental and non-governmental organizations should:

• communicate, through political and diplomatic channels, the need for Ukraine to maintain a pluralistic landscape of respected media, whether electronic or traditional;
• restore, to the extent possible, or compensate for the cut in USAID funding to Ukrainian media outlets and NGOs involved in research and improving journalism;
• continue and expand, together with Ukrainian partners, monitoring of recent developments in the electronic, social and traditional media landscape in Ukraine;
• strengthen and/or expand existing anti-disinformation projects and networks and facilitate stronger cross-border cooperation between anti-disinformation initiatives in the Eastern Partnership countries, the European Union and beyond

[1]Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge, 2014.

[2] Diana Dutsyk, Marta Dyczok, «Ukraine's Media. A Field Where Power Is Contested», in: Matthew Rojansky, Georgiy Kasianov, Mykhail Minakov (eds.), From “the Ukraine” to Ukraine: A Contemporary History, 1991-2021. Stuttgart, 2021, pp. 169-206.

[3] Anna Korbut, “Strengthening Public interest in Ukraine's media sector”. Chatham House, 17.5.2021.

[4] “75% of Ukraine’s media are owned by politicians and oligarchs – monitoring”. Ukrainska Pravda, 11.10.2016.

[5] «Ukaz Prezydenta Ukrainy № 43/2021.» Prezident Ukrainy Volodymyr Zelens'kyy, 2.2.2021, www.president.gov.ua/documents/432021-36441.

[6] Andreas Umland, «Die ukrainischen Präsidentschaftswahlen 2019 im historischen Kontext: Paradoxa und Ursachen der Niederlage des Amtsinhabers Petro Poroschenko.» Zeitschrift für Politik, no. 4/2020, pp. 418-436.

[7] «Upershe za bahato rokiv v Ukrainy zmenshylasia kil'kist' oliharkhiv, i deoliharkhizatsii tryvatyme – Volodymyr Zelens'kyy.“Prezident Ukrainy Volodymyr Zelens'kyy, 14.5.2021, www.president.gov.ua/news/upershe-za-bagato-rokiv-v-ukrayini-zmenshilasya-kilkist-olig-68445.

[8] Otar Dovzhenko, «Iz kozhnoi prasky: Use, shcho varto znaty pro natsional'nyy telemarafon.» Detective media, 24.5.2022.

[9] «Monomarafon: Chomu vlada prypynyla movlennia 5 kanalu, Priamoho ta 'Espreso'.» Detective media, 19.4.2022.

[10] Nataliia Dan'kova, „Do peremohy i dali? Shcho bude z edynym telemarafonom.“ Detective media, 9.8.2023

[11] Nataliia Dan'kova, «Budget-2024: how much money is planned for the media, culture, cinema, «Armiia TB», «Dim», «FreeDom» and the marathon.» Detektor media, 29.11.2023.

[12] Anton Hrushets'kyy, «Dovira from the telemarafonu 'Edyni novyny'.» Kyivs'kyj mizhnarodnyj institut sotsiolohii, 19.2.2024.

[13] “Ukraine Report 2024.” European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), 30.10.2024, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2024_en.

[14] «Minister Tochyts'kyy responds to criticism of EU telemarathon.» Radio Svoboda, 31.10.2024.

[15] Ira Kryts'ka, Denys Krasnikov, «Vplyv za $10 mln na rik.» Forbes, 11/10/2021.

[16] “15% of TV and radio companies stopped broadcasting due to Russia’s invasion.” Detektor media, 17.6.2022.

[17] “IMI whitelist for the second half of 2024: 13 media outlets excluded.” Mass Information Institute. 1.11.2024.

[18] “Ukrainians consider information manipulation a serious problem affecting their lives, although sensitivity to Russian disinformation is increasing.” Internews, 7.11.2024.

[19] Diana Dutsyk, Yuliya Dukach, Olha Iurkova, Anastasiya Plys, Oksana Pochapska, Anastasiia Sychova, How Non-Institutionalized News Telegram Channels Operate and Capture the Audience in Ukrainian Segment. UMCI. Kiev, 2023, .

[20] «Budanov: Telegram – tse zagroza natsbezpetsi.» UkrInform, 7.9.2024.

[21] Iryna Sysak, Valeriia Egoshyna, Iuliia Khymeryk, „Nebezbechnyj trend.” Radio Svoboda, 8.10.2024.

[22] Vitaliy Gusev, „Melodramy dlia Meksyky ta SShA.” Forbes, 11/26/2024.

[23] «Ukrains'ki ta mizhnarodni media y orhanizatsii zibrali na kraudfandynhu ponad 4,8 mln evro.» Forbes, 6/30/2022.

[24] «Nakaz Holovnokomanduvacha Zbroynykh Syl Ukrainy №73.» Ministerstvo oborony Ukrainy, 3.3.2022, www.mil.gov.ua/content/mou_orders/nakaz_73_zi_zminamu.pdf.

[25] Dariia Opryshko, Monitorynh media pliuralizmu v tsyfrovu eru. Florence, 2023.

[26] “Pid chas viyny zberihaet'sia svoboda slova v Ukraini, ale edynyj marafon treba prypyniaty – opytuvannia zhurnalistiv.” Zmina, 3.5.2023.

[27] David L. Stern and Robyn Dixon, “Independent media in Russia, Ukraine loses its funding with USAID freeze”, The Washington Post, 7.2.2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/07/ukraine-russia-independent-media-trump-usaid/.

[28] Galyna Piskorska, “Local newspapers are a lifeline in Ukraine, but USAID cuts may force many to close or become biased mouthpieces,” The Conversation, 17.3.2025. https://theconversation.com/local-newspapers-are-a-lifeline-in-ukraine-but-usaid-cuts-may-force-many-to-close-or-become-biased-mouthpieces-250917.

[29] Anita Prasad, «Mayzhe 60% zhurnalistiv ochikuiut' katastrofichnykh naslidkiv dlia media vid zupynky dopomohy SShA – opytuvannia IMI», Forbes, 4.2.2025. https://forbes.ua/news/mayzhe-60-zhurnalistiv-ochikuyut-katastrofichnikh-naslidkiv-dlya-media-vid-zupinki-inozemnoi-dopomogi-ssha-opituvannya-imi-04022025-26868.

[30] «Pid chas viyny zberihaet'sia svoboda slova v Ukraini.»