Onur Alp Yılmaz wrote: CHP's imaginary West and which West?

The speech made by CHP Chairman Özgür Özel at the Congress of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in Amsterdam has reopened the party's foreign policy vision to discussion.

While addressing European social democrats as “brother parties,” Özel presented Turkey’s military power in NATO as an element of cooperation and called on them to “not take Erdoğan’s army and ignore anti-democratic practices.”

While this discourse appears to emphasize democracy, it is open to criticism on many fronts. However, I will limit my criticism to both the CHP's historical legacy, to which Özel frequently refers, and the current political landscape. I will then conclude by listing my recommendations from an article I wrote a few months ago.

Atatürk's concept of "West" was not a geographical direction to the West of Türkiye, but rather a symbol of the most advanced level that civilization had reached at that time.

Therefore, he distinguished between “civilizational Europe” and “official Europe” and placed universal values ​​(science, reason, law) before pragmatic interests.

So much so that, in the letter he sent to the embassies of the occupying states and their supporters after the occupation of Istanbul, he judged the West, which is a geographical aspect, and the established interests of the West with the values ​​of the West, which represents civilization:

This final blow dealt to the political sovereignty and freedom of the Ottoman nation is not so much an attack on us Ottomans, determined to defend our lives and existence at all costs, but on all the principles held sacred by twentieth-century civilization and humanity (...). This act, a plunder unlike anything recorded in history, was committed under a system that deprived our nation of the means of defense through an Armistice Agreement drawn up in accordance with Wilson's principles, and is therefore incompatible with the honor and dignity of the nations concerned. We leave the judgment of this act not to the conscience of official Europe and America, but to the conscience of the Europe and America of science, culture, and civilization. Finally, we call the world's attention once again to the great historical responsibility that will arise from this event . ¹

Indeed, Tarık Zafer Tunaya called Atatürk's understanding, which distinguished between the established Western order and the level of civilization it had reached, "the West despite the West." From this perspective, Atatürk's goal of "contemporary civilization" was not a static imitation of the West, but a dynamic vision. According to this view, the center of civilization could shift. This, in turn, pointed to the famous emphasis Atatürk added to his goal of "attaining the level of contemporary civilizations": "to surpass."

Today, when discussions are taking place for the first time in 500 years about whether civilization is changing direction, there is no doubt that this vision is even more meaningful.

The rise of Asia, the questioning of the West's hegemonic power, and the emergence of new centers of power indicate that the geographical boundaries of civilization are being redefined.

The CHP's pledge of "loyalty" to the West at such a time, as if none of this were happening, contradicts Atatürk's flexible and universal understanding of civilization.

Of course, I see the “autocrats-democrats” construct that the CHP makes against European social democrats.

I am even aware of the CHP's efforts to deepen the conflicts between "autocrats and democrats," the US and Europe, and the US establishment and Trump, with the idea that there is no homogeneous West.

In fact, I intend to question the practical equivalent of such a setup.

Because the message to European social democrats that "we are on the same page as you" positions the CHP as a dependent actor unable to adapt to global dynamics, weakening its bargaining power with Europe. This poses a serious problem for the CHP not only in principle but also pragmatically.

What is expected from Europe seems to be not to ignore Erdoğan's authoritarian practices and to support the opposition's (and indirectly the CHP's) struggle for democracy by not remaining silent against these practices.

But isn't this demand confined to a security-focused bargaining language?

Isn't it saying, "Take Türkiye's army, but support democracy"?

Does this merely reverse-replicate Erdoğan’s “your security depends on me” rhetoric, changing the actor (CHP instead of Erdoğan)?

The “take security, give support to democracy” approach overshadows the principled value of democracy by turning it into a bargaining chip and prevents the CHP from establishing moral superiority – perhaps its most important trump card – in this respect.

Moreover, considering Europe's pragmatic interests (security, migration control), the CHP's "we also offer security" message does not offer a sufficient alternative to change the current status quo (cooperation with Erdoğan).

Özel's naming of European social democratic parties as "sister parties" ignores historical and current contradictions.

What do I mean?

European social democracy has in the past frequently subordinated universal values ​​to national interests.

The German SPD's support for war credits in the First World War and the direct or indirect endorsement of colonial policies by many social democratic parties point to the tainted aspects of this legacy.

Moreover, the Ottoman Empire was one of the victims of this colonial order, and the Treaties of Mudros and Sèvres were products of the West's imperialist imagination.

As I underlined above, Atatürk's War of Independence was a rebellion against this imagination.

Indeed, the “democratic left” identity adopted by the CHP during the Ecevit era instead of the concept of social democracy aimed to distance itself from this colonial memory and to blend Türkiye’s struggle for independence with universal values.

As Kemal Anadol puts it when explaining the reasons for using this concept:

" Britain ruled India, a country many times larger than itself, until 1949. Tiny Holland had conquered the vast Indonesia. France had exploited the underground and surface resources of a significant portion of Africa. (...) Even before World War I, German social democrats had supported German militarism and voted to enter the war. The Republic of Turkey was founded on an anti-imperialist foundation that achieved success for the first time in the world." ²

Özel's "sister parties" discourse, on the other hand, blurs this principled distinction in the CHP's history and identifies the CHP with parties with a historically contradictory legacy.

Moreover, the mental world of European social democrats has not changed today.

For example, instead of directly objecting to Middle East policies, these parties focus on the immigration crisis that is a result of these policies.

Isn't the 2016 EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement based on the logic of "keep the migrants, let's remain silent about your authoritarianism"?

During this period, in some EU countries, the social democrats, whom Özel categorizes as “brother parties,” were in power or partners in power in Europe, but far from reacting meaningfully to this logic, were they not active supporters of this process?

This means that European social democrats support pragmatic policies, concerned with preventing the rise of the far right and protecting national interests.

So, in this respect, what kind of pragmatic basis does Erdoğan's presence serve for them?

It provides them with both a “buffer” leader who can stop the influx of migrants and an element of fear that they can present as an “authoritarian threat” to their domestic public opinion.

That's why Western actors can display a very homogeneous attitude when it comes to their national interests.

Especially when their interlocutors are an Eastern society…

Despite all this, the CHP's calling these parties "brothers" carries the risk of legitimizing their contradictory stances and, contrary to popular belief, offers a comfort zone where they can engage with Erdoğan on a less costly basis.

In other words, the CHP's commitment to "loyalty" to the West and its security-focused bargaining language do not increase its bargaining power, but rather reduce it.

While Europe can maintain its existing security and migration agreements with Erdoğan, the CHP's message that "we offer the same" does not make it an indispensable partner.

On the contrary, the CHP’s “brother parties” rhetoric offers a comfort zone that will encourage European social democrats to maintain the current status quo.

Because with such a political setup, the CHP will not be perceived as a "threat," as an alternative force that exposes the current dirty deals with an anti-imperialist language and puts the West in a difficult position under the pressure of domestic public opinion.

On the contrary, they will be seen as a “harmonious” partner who has given up hope on all of this and is looking for a solution within themselves.

Based on these conclusions, I would like to conclude by reiterating the still current warnings I made in an article I wrote in July:

This complex process cannot be overcome solely with domestic political readings, poll-focused strategies and visits to the West.

Indeed, as examined in detail above, what matters to the West is not how democratic an ally a country is, but how much it serves or threatens its own hegemony.

In this context, it is crucial to correctly understand the process being packaged as a "Turkey Without Terrorism" and, above all, its relationship to new imperialist aggression. In its most concise form, this process is the process of building a "Turkey Without Republic and Democracy" in exchange for aligning with US theses in the Middle East, within the context of imperialism's new redistribution of power in the Middle East.

Through negotiations carried out among the elites, efforts are being made to include Turks and Kurds in the Arab axis established by the USA against Iran, which balances its influence in the Middle East through Israel.

The response to this will be an imperialist bloc that consents to the establishment of a system in which the CHP and the opposition will be liquidated, and positions and resources will be distributed not through democratic means, but through “leaders” appointed to identities and therefore through authoritarian bargaining.

For this very reason, anti-imperialism against imperialism; the Turkish-Kurdish democratic alliance against the authoritarian alliance of the AK Party, MHP, Öcalan, and the US; citizenship against fantasies of the Ummah, and national sovereignty against sultanates are concepts that must be defended together.

As the first step of this transformation, in order to both be addressed by the West and to diminish the government's public support, an approach is needed that will explain the government's relations with the West-Israel axis with analytical depth, reveal how Türkiye's national interests are being compromised, and publicly complain about the government in this regard.

In other words, it is necessary not to “complain about Türkiye to the West,” but to complain about the West and the self-interested relations that the government has with it to society.

Otherwise, the rhetoric of "I will establish better relations with the West" and politics reduced to domestic policy, media, and polls are tantamount to what Americans call "adjusting deck chairs while the Titanic sinks." This misses the point that we have entered an era where this style of politics, imposed by the polished image era that has entered our lives with neoliberalism, has no real counterpart.

Therefore, in this period when we are at the very center of events in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Europe, it is inevitable to realize that we are in a process where the CHP must transcend politics reduced to image, correctly read the subject-structure tensions, and consider how to establish a line of tension with the structure as a subject that will provide maximum gain for the country and the opposition.

Let the last word come from Kağan Sarıkaya: “The first way the nation can trust you is to make the nation feel that you trust them.” ³

1 Speech, pp. 557-559.

2 Kemal Anadol, When You Rewind the Film , Doğan Kitap, Istanbul, 2015, p. 297.

3 https://kagansarikaya.substack.com/p/tansma-siyasi-vip-lounge-kbrs-1